Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal
Volume 21

Article 4

9-1-2002

Human Cloning: Beyond the Realm of the Constitutional Right to
Procreative Liberty
Maureen McBrien
Suffolk University Law School (Student)

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/bpilj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Family Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy
Commons

Recommended Citation
Maureen McBrien, Human Cloning: Beyond the Realm of the Constitutional Right to Procreative Liberty, 21
Buff. Envtl. L.J. 107 (2002).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/bpilj/vol21/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

HUMAN CLONING: BEYOND THE REALM OF
THE CONSTITUIONAL RIGHT TO
PROCREATIVE LIBERTY
Maureen McBrien*
"[C]loning ...replicates everything that [is] troubling about
reproductive technologies: excessive commercialization,
reckless experimentation on women, procedures undertaken
without consent, unmonitored physical and psychological
risks. From my point of view, it [is] time to reverse the
process. Cloning seem[s] to be the perfect opportunity to shift
the burden of proof, to ask scientists to give a good reason
rather than a false promise before they beg[i]n the technique,
to show why it [is] really necessary, and to design a system
from the start to protect the participants."'

I. INTRODUCTION
When headlines appeared in February of 1997 proclaiming
that Scottish scientist Ian Wilmut had successfully cloned an adult
sheep named Dolly, imaginations quickly drifted toward the
prospect of human cloning. Before Dolly, potential cloners had
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The author will receive her J.D. degree from Suffolk University Law School
in May 2003 and begin her judicial clerkship for the Massachusetts Probate
and Family Courts in September 2003. She received her Bachelor of Arts
degrees in Biology and Spanish from Gettysburg College. She would like to
thank Sophia Kolehmainen at the Council for Responsible Genetics in
Cambridge, Massachusetts for her assistance in writing this article.
LORI B. ANDREWS, THE CLONE AGE 258 (Henry Holt and Co. 1 ed.
1999).
Tim Radford, German Fury Over Cloning, THE GuARDIAN, Feb. 28, 1997,
at 1; Margaret Talbot, A Desire to Duplicate, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 4,
2001, at 40. In a process called somatic cell nuclear transfer, Wilmut
transferred and fused with an electrical pulse from the cell of an adult ewe
to a hollowed donor egg consisting of only outer membranes and
cytoplasm. The resulting embryo was then implanted and gestated in the
uterus of a surrogate sheep. Id.at 44-45. "Dolly" was the sole survivor of
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nothing other than science fiction to encourage them. 3 Dolly
inspired companies to forge ahead despite Dr. Wilmut's
declaration that human cloning is totally unacceptable, technically
difficult and extremely dangerous. 4 Advanced Cell Technology,
Inc. in Worcester, Massachusetts again stirred public debate when
it announced on November 24, 2001 that it had successfully cloned
human embryos. 5 A year later, a spokesperson for Clonaid and the
religious sect known as the Radlians announced the scientifically
unconfirmed birth of the world's first human clone. 6 Most
recently, the safety of human cloning was again called into
question when news arrived that Dolly survived only half her

277 cloned embryos. George J. Annas, Commentaries: Human Cloning: A
3
4

6

Choice Or An Echo? 23 DAYTON L. REV. 247, 256 (1998).
See Talbot, supra, note 2, at 44.
Scientific Discoveries in Cloning: Challenges for Pub. Policy: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. On Pub. Health and Safety of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Res., 105th Cong. 22 (1997) (Statement of Dr. Ian
Wilmut); Andrews, supra note 1, at 208 (noting reproductive technologies
are being offered without sufficient thought about their impact or
desirability). Reproductive technologies tend "to be adopted as a matter of
course once they become technically feasible, without a careful assessment
of the ethical issues involved." Id. at 234 (quoting geneticist Angus Clarke).
Jose B. Cibelli et al., The FirstHuman Cloned Embryo, 286 SCI. AM. 1, 42
(2002) (detailing ACT announcement). Jose B. Cibelli, Robert P. Lanza and
Michael D. West of the privately funded biotechnology company,
Advanced Cell Technology, Inc., announced the first human cloned embryo
and human embryos generated only from eggs. Id; see also Human Embryo
CreatedThrough Cloning (Nov. 25, 2001), at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/TECH/science/i 1/25/human.embryo.clone/index
.html (summarizing Advanced Cell Technology announcement).
Chemist Claims First Cloned Human, MSNBC News Servs. (Dec. 27,
2002) (claiming first place in the race to produce a human clone). The
spokesperson, Brigitte Boisselier, head of Clonaid, would not reveal the
names of the parents or where the baby was born. Id She claimed that a
thirty-one year old American woman whose husband is infertile gave birth
to a clone of herself. Id. She did not present DNA evidence, leaving her
claim scientifically unsupported. Id.

2002-2003

Human Cloning

expected lifespan. 7 At age six, scientists euthanized the world's
first cloned 8mammal after discovering that she had progressive
lung disease.
Although the United States House of Representatives voted
to ban human cloning in the summer of 2001 and attached
penalties of up to ten years in prison and a one million dollar fine
for those convicted of attempting to do so, the United States Senate
never addressed the issue; thus, it never became law.9 As a result,
human cloning remains largely unregulated. 10 In response to
Clonaid's announcement, President George W. Bush is pushing
Congress to ban human cloning.1 ' If human cloning is legally
banned, opponents will undoubtedly challenge the ban on
constitutional grounds as a violation of the right to procreative
liberty. 12 This article proposes how to overcome that challenge. 13
This article addresses the constitutional, social, and moral
issues associated with a society facing the use of human cloning as

7
8

Andy Coghlan, A Sad Farewell for Dolly the Sheep, The World's First
Cloned Mammal, NEW SCIENTIST 5 (Mar. 22, 2003).
Id. Dr. Wilmut thinks Dolly's death was unrelated to the fact that she was a

clone because a sheep in the same vicinity as Dolly died of the same
condition two years earlier and may have infected Dolly. Id. It remains
uncertain, however, whether Dolly aged quicker because she inherited the
cellular age of the six-year old donor cell used to clone her. Id. Dolly will
be stuffed and displayed at the National Museum of Scotland. Id.
H.R. 2505, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001); Human Embryo CreatedThrough
Cloning, supra note 5 (noting human cloning legislation). The U.S. Senate
was supposed to take up the issue in early 2002. See Cibelli, supra note 5,
at 49.
1o InternationalOpposition to Cloning (Aug. 29, 2001), at
http://www.cnn.com/200 i/WORLD/europe/08/07/clone.legislation/index.ht
ml (last visited Mar. 17, 2003) (noting that human cloning is prohibited in
Britain but the law is vague in most countries).
11 See Chemist Claims First Cloned Human, supra note 6 (noting that despite
skepticism, Congress still needs to ban human cloning).
12
See infra Part IV (analyzing arguments for and against the constitutionality
of the use of cloning as a reproductive option).
'3
See infra Part IV (proposing why reproductive cloning is beyond the realm
of the constitutional right to procreative liberty).
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a reproductive option.14 Part II introduces the debate over human
cloning and existing reproductive technologies, the parties
involved, and the potential risks. 15 Part III presents and categorizes
various Supreme Court's (Court) "right to privacy" decisions that
created and established a right to procreative liberty. 16 Part IV
analyzes the scope of the Court's declared "right of the individual.
. .[to decide] whether to bear or beget a child"'17 and analyzes
whether that right should extend to the use of human cloning as a
reproductive option. 18 The foundation of the argument lies in
distinguishing the use of cloning as a reproductive option from
existing reproductive technologies that have been granted
constitutional protection, proving that human cloning extends
beyond the realm of the constitutionally protected right to
procreative liberty. 19 Part V concludes that this argument may be
used to combat the contention that a ban on human cloning is
unconstitutional.20
II. FACTS
A. What is Human Cloning ?
Human cloning requires a successful somatic cell nuclear
transfer, a process by which an enucleated donor egg cell is fused
See infra Part IV (analyzing whether human cloning falls within
the
constitutionally protected right to procreative freedom).
15 See infra Part II (detailing the facts of the public
debate over human
cloning).
16
See infra Part III (examining the history of human cloning and the
constitutionally established right to procreative liberty).
17 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S, 438, 453 (1972).
'S See infra Part IV; see also Ann MacLean Massie, Symposium on John A.
Robertson's Children of Choice: Regulating Choice: A Constitutional Law
Response to ProfessorJohn A. Robertson's Children of Choice, 52 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 135, 152 (1995) (proposing questions regarding
interpretations of the Supreme Court's right to privacy decisions).
19 See infra Parts IV, V (arguing that human cloning falls outside the
constitutionally protected right to procreative liberty).
20
See infra Part V (summarizing how to legally uphold a human cloning ban).
14
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with the nucleus from an adult human body cell. 2 1 The resulting
embryo is implanted and gestated in the uterus of a surrogate
mother. 22 Essentially, cloning produces a later-born twin of a
previously or currently existing individual.23 Unlike natural twins,
"clones" are not one hundred percent genetically identical
because
the cloning process requires the fusion of an enucleated donor cell
containing its own mitochondrial DNA with the nucleic DNA from
another cell to create a slightly varied genetic code.2 4 The donor
cell's mitochondrial DNA comprises approximately five percent of
the clone's genes. 25 Additionally, gestating clones in different
uteruses may cause them to develop differently, so that they may
not appear identical. 26
B. Existing Methods of Assisted Reproduction
More than 177,000 American babies have been born from
assisted reproductive technologies. 27 Artificial insemination is the
oldest and most common form of assisted conception.28 It leads to
childbirth in about forty percent of women who undergo this
procedure. 29 Artificial insemination is used to treat male infertility

21

22
23

24
25

26
27

28

29

Talbot, supra note 2, at 44.
Id. at 45.
Lori B. Andrews, Is There A Right to Clone? ConstitutionalChallenges
to
Bans on Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 647 (1999).
Id. (explaining the disparity between naturally occurring and cloned
twins).
Mark D. Eibert, Human Cloning, Infertility and Reproductive
Freedom,
REASON MAG. ONLINE (last visited on Aug. 2001), at
http://www.reason.com/opeds/eibert.html.
Id.
Frequently Asked Questions About Infertility, AM. SOC'Y FOR
REPROD.
MED.
(last
visited
Jan.
13,
2003),
at
http://www.asrm.com/Patients/faqs.html (commenting on reproductive
technology success). The statistics was calculated through the end of 1999.
Id
Emily McAllister, Defining Parent-Child Relationship In An
Age of
Reproductive Technology: Implications for Inheritance, 29 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 55, 58 (1994).
Id. at 59.
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by injecting semen from the recipient's husband or an anonymous
30
donor directly into the woman's uterus.
In Vitro Fertilization(IVF) was the first means of assisted
reproduction that involved fertilization outside of a woman's
body. 3 1 IVF also represented the first time a gestational mother,
acting as a surrogate, could give birth to a genetically unrelated
child.32 The IVF process involves removing eggs from a woman's
body, fertilizing them with sperm in a petri dish, and transferring a
few embryos into a woman's uterus with the goal of successful
implantation and pregnancy. 33 IVF was introduced into the United
States in 1981, and between 1985 and 1998, over 91,000 babies
34
were born from the procedure.
Gamete Introfallopian Transfer (GIFT) is identical to IVF
except that fertilization occurs in the fallopian tube instead of in a
petri dish. 35 Eggs are removed from the woman's body and then
transferred with semen into the fallopian tube, where fertilization
36
naturally occurs.

Finally, doctors began offering intracytoplasmic sperm
injection (ICSI) in 1993 in situations where the male partner has a
low sperm count.3 7 In ICSI, the woman's eggs are harvested the
same way as they are in IVF and the eggs are then directly injected
38
in vitro with the sperm.
30

31
32

33
34

35

Id. AIH is insemination with the husband's sperm and AID is insemination
with a donor's sperm. Id.
Id. at 60. Louise Brown was the first "test tube baby," resulting from
successful IVF in England in 1978. Id.
Annas, supra note 2, at 253. An IVF child can have up to five parents. Id.
McAllister, supra note 28, at 60-61.
Frequently Asked Questions About Infertility, supra note 27. The average
live delivery rate for IVF was 29.1 percent per retrieval in 1998. Id. Time
will tell whether children created through IVF will have trouble
reproducing. Andrews, supra note 1, at 209.
McAllister, supra note 28, at 63.

36

Id.

37

Andrews, supra note 1, at 210.
Id. ICSI changed the notion that it would be unethical to subject a fertile
woman to the egg retrieval rigors of IVF to combat her husband's infertility.
Id. According to studies in Belgium and Australia, children created by ICSI

38

2002-2003

Human Cloning

C. The Infertility Market Factor
Infertility is defined as "[t]he inability to conceive after a
year of unprotected intercourse in women under thirty-five, or after
six months in women over thirty-five, or the inability to carry a
pregnancy to term." 39 Infertility affects about 6.1 million
Americans, or ten percent of the reproductive age population. 40
Infertile couples' desperation to have biologically related children
41
is propelling the fertility industry to expand at a remarkable rate.
Couples can spend up to $200,000 to achieve a single pregnancy,
which fuels the two billion dollar per year industry and makes
42
infertility specialists the highest paid physicians in America.
Market forces also contribute to the increased push for the legal
use of human cloning as a reproductive option and simultaneously
43
eliminate the ethical barriers surrounding its controversial use.
D. Why Attempt to Clone Humans ?
Although ten percent of Americans of reproductive age are
considered infertile, only twenty percent of infertile couples
successfully
reproduce
through
existing
reproductive
technologies.44 Many infertile couples who successfully reproduce

39

40

41
42

4

are twice as likely to have major chromosomal abnormalities than children
who are conceived naturally. Id.at 210-11.
A Glossary of Infertility Terms and Acronyms, INT'L COUNCIL ON
INFERILITY INFO. DISSEMINATION (INCID) (last visited Jan. 2003), at
http://www.inciid.org/glossaryijk.html; Frequently Asked Questions About
Infertility, supra note 27.
Frequently Asked QuestionsAbout Infertility, supra note 27.
Id. at 220. While every state regulates adoption, only Florida, Virginia and
New Hampshire regulate assisted reproductive technologies. Id.
Andrews, supra note 1, at 48 (noting that experienced infertility specialists
make an average of $625,000 per year).
Annas, supra note 2, at 258 (discussing how market forces shape demand
for and uses of new reproductive technologies); Andrews, supra note 1, at
208 (stating that reproductive technologies are usually implemented once
technology is feasible without sufficient regard to ethical issues).
Eibert, supra note 25.
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are compelled to use donated eggs or sperm. 45 The lure of human
cloning as a potentially superior and preferable method to
alternative reproductive options stems from its prospective, unique
ability to create a genetically related child without third party
donor involvement.4 Completely infertile couples in which both
partners are medically unable to produce viable sperm and eggs,
and lesbian couples, for example, could utilize the cloning option
to conceive a genetically related child without that child bearing
any genetic relationship to a third party, as is the case with gamete
donation. 47 Eliminating a third party would prevent complications
that frequently arise when a third party wishes to parent or
otherwise get involved in the child's life.48 Cloning would
represent a first for same-sex reproduction, as it would grant
lesbian couples the ability to reproduce without male
participation. 9 A third group who would potentially elect human
cloning are those otherwise fertile couples with serious genetic
disorders who choose to forgo other available options such as
embryo selection or gamete donation and elect human cloning to
produce their own healthy genetically related child. 50 The more
45

Id.

46

Note, Human Cloning and Substantive Due Process, 111 HARv. L. REv.
2348, 2349-50 (1998).
Talbot, supra note 2, at 67. A completely infertile couple is a couple in
which the woman cannot produce eggs because of the lack of ovaries and
where the man fails to produce sperm because his testicles have failed to
develop or have been removed. Ronald M. Green, I, Clone, SCI. AM., Sept.
1999 (last visited Sept. 26, 2001), at
http://www.sciam.com/article.cfin?articlelD=000329A6-CE72-1 CFB93F6809EC5880000&pageNumber=2&catlD=9 (describing desire for the
use of human cloning to create a genetically related child).
Talbot, supra note 2, at 67.
Andrews, supranote 23, at 649.
Talbot, supra note 2, at 67; Human Cloning and Substantive Due Process,
supra note 46, at 2350. People want to clone solely so that they can assure a
child's genetic composition. Andrews, supra note 23, at 654 (detailing
cloning's potential psychological impacts). For these couples, cloning may
represent the only manner in which they would be willing to carry on their
genes. Id.at 647-48.

47

48
49

50
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apparent clone-seekers are the aggrieved who advocate cloning as
a means of "replacing" a deceased loved one. 51 The Radlians'
project called Clonaid, for example, receives calls from parents of
deceased children who have frozen their childrens' tissue
in the
52
possible.
be
will
dead
the
of
cloning
someday
that
hope
E. The Risks
There are many physical risks inherent in trying to clone a
human being. 53 Human cloning requires that the differentiated
DNA of the adult cell's nucleus be deactivated and then
reactivated, which creates the possibility of creating new mutations
or otherwise damaging the DNA. 54 There is also concern that a
clone may inherit the cellular age of the nucleus donor, thus
predisposing the clone to premature aging and cancer. 55 In
addition, cells develop mutations as they age and since an adult
cell is used in the cloning procedure, the mutations already present
56
in that cell would manifest themselves in all of the clones' cells.
5

Talbot, supra note 2, at 43.

52

id.

53
54

Andrews, supranote 23, at 649-52.
Id. at 650. An adult cell has a full complement of genes, only some of which
are activated. Id Activating the genes that are turned off may reveal hidden
mutations. Id The high rate of death in animal cloning experiments
suggests that cloning may damage cell DNA. Id.
Andrews, supra note 23, at 650-51. Scientists are not certain whether Dolly
inherited the cellular age of her six-year-old progenitor or her own genetic
clock. Id. at 650. Dolly's life may have been shortened because the tips of
her chromosomes, or her telomeres, which shrink as cells grow older, were
shorter than normal for her age. See Green, supra note 47. Further
supporting the premature aging theory is the fact that Dolly had arthritis at
age five and a half in her left hind leg at the hip and the knee. Cloned Dolly
Has Arthritis, CNN (Jan. 4, 2002), at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/TECH/science/01/04/cloning.dolly/index.html.
An investigation into Dolly's death in February 2003 from advanced lung
cancer may confirm scientists' earlier theories that Dolly inherited the
cellular age of the nucleus of the donor used to create her. See Coghlan,
supra note 7.
David Orentlicher, Cloning andthe Preservationof Family Integrity, 59 LA.
L. REV. 1019, 1021 (1999).

55

56
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Furthermore, current experiments in animal cloning result in gross
deformities, such as calves born with disease and abnormally large
hearts, which seriously impede trials in human cloning.5 7 Dr.
Wilmut notes that "with people, the possibility of failures, many of
which would involve miscarriages, sounds horrific and raises huge
ethical barriers." 58 Because of this high degree of risk, it may
59
never be ethical or justified to clone humans.
If the application of cloning is successful in humans,
additional psychological risks to the cloned child may manifest
themselves throughout his or her life.6 ° Cloning would dramatically
alter the traditional family relationship by introducing a later-born
twin into the family. 6 1 If a clone were created from a dead child,
the parents' expectations would be undermined even though that
clone was unique, despite a similar physical appearance. 62 A
clone's sense of self and autonomy would also be seriously
undermined if he was created to replace a deceased sibling.63
On a much broader societal scale, cloning, if widely
implemented, could interfere with evolution by promoting genetic
uniformity and thus decreasing resistance to disease.64
57

58
59

60
61
62

63

64

Andrews, supra note 23, at 651-52. It took 277 attempts to clone
Dolly,
which is perhaps acceptable with sheep but certainly not with humans.
Annas, supra note 2, at 247.
Andrews, supra note 23, at 652.
Annas, supra note 2, at 267; see Eibert, supra note 25 (suggesting
that
cloning bans would outlaw the very research needed to make cloning safe
and criticizing the proposed ban for not having a provision that would lift
the ban once the technology was considered safe). Louise Brown, however,
falsified the safety argument against trying IVF in humans. Annas, supra
note 2, at 267.
Andrews, supranote 23, at 652-57.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 653. Parents might overprotect a clone because their first child had
died and they also might limit the experiences of the clone to those of the
first child. Id.
Id. at 655. The original's life "would always haunt the later twin,
standing
as an undue influence on the latter's life and shaping it in ways to which
others lives are not vulnerable." Id
Id.at 656. Genetic variation is our species' greatest defense. Id.
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Furthermore, if cloning becomes a widespread and routine
procedure, people could be cloned without their consent or
knowledge since it only requires one cell, which can be obtained
65
from hair or saliva.
III. HISTORY
A. The History of Human Cloning
Human cloning has long been the fodder of science fiction,
manifesting itself as the plot in several books and films.66 In 1997,
however, when the news of Dolly arrived on the front pages of
newspapers and on television, human cloning made the leaping
transition from science fiction to potential reality. 67 In June 1997,
public reaction, mixed with fascination and horror, prompted
President Bill Clinton to sign a five-year ban on the use of federal
funds for human cloning research.68 Before the option to use
human cloning for reproductive purposes existed, four states
passed laws against it to highlight the potential dire implications of
65
66

67
68

Orentlichter, supra note 56, at 1025.
Annas, supra note 2, at 254-55 (mentioning' human cloning literature and
films). Literary examples include Aldous Huxley's BRAVE NEW
WORLD, Ira Levin's THE BOYS FROM BRAZIL, and Fay Weldon's
THE CLONING OF JOANA MAY. Id. at 255. BLADE RUNNER (Warner
Studios 1982), SLEEPER (MGM/UA Studios 1973), THE BOYS FROM
BRAZIL (Artisan Ent. 1978), MULTIPLICITY (Columbia/Tristar Studios
1996), JURASSIC PARK (Universal Studios 1973), and GATTICA
(Columbia/Tristar Studios) are popular films. Id at 254. In 1994, the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) Human Embryo Research Panel Report
dismissed human cloning in a footnote declaring that "[p]opular notions of
cloning derive[d] from science fiction books and films... have more to do
with cultural fantasies than actual scientific experiments." Id at 250.
Id at 257. "Until a few years ago, would-be cloners had little to encourage
them. . ." Talbot, supra note 2, at 44.
Cloning Human Beings, NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N
(June 1997), at http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/nbac/pubs.html;
Andrews, supra note 23, at 675 (discussing constitutional justification for
the Cloning Prohibition Act of 1997). The legislative proposal cited safety
and ethics concerns as well as the effect of cloning on interstate commerce
as justifications for the ban. Id.
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this risky method of reproduction. 69 In addition, the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) declared human cloning research
70
ineligible for NIH funding in its stem cell research guidelines.
Somatic cell cloning is the first technique that the American
Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) has ever opposed. 7 '
Despite the bans and the risks, adamant support for the advance of
human cloning is found in radical private organizations such as the
Radlians, who claim 55,000 members worldwide that strive for
everlasting life created through technology 72 and in certain rogue
scientists like Dr. Severino Antinori, who boasted in March, 2001
that he would clone a human within a year. 73
B. The Constitutionalityof Reproductive Rights
The right of privacy, derived from the liberty principles
guaranteed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
encompasses the right to procreative liberty which has been
established in a long line of the Court's decisions. 74 Currently, all
existing methods of assisted reproduction are afforded some degree
of constitutional protection under a broad interpretation of

69

Talbot, supra note 2, at 40.

70

NIH Fact Sheet on Human Pluripotent Stem Cell Research Guidelines,

71
72

NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH (updated Jan. 2001),
at http://www.nih.gov/news/stemcell/stemfactsheet.htm.
Annas, supra note 2, at 265.
Talbot, supra note 2, at 42. The Radlians were founded by a French-born
man named Rael in 1973 who claims he heard a message that humans were
created in a laboratory by aliens who were masters of genetics. Id. at 63.
Their project is called "Clonaid" and the group is based in Montreal. Id.
Candice Hughes, Italian Doctor Warned Over Cloning, ASSOC. PRESS,

74

Mar. 12, 2001, at http://gladstone.uoregon.edu/-insurgnt/12.5/lefturn.html
(last visited Mar. 12, 2001).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. "[Nior shall any State deprive any person
of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id The same
language is reiterated in the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see
infra Parts Ill.C, III.D (discussing relevant Supreme Court cases).
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75
reproductive rights derived from constitutional liberty principles.

If human cloning were to become a feasible reproductive option,
its constitutionality would also involve an examination of the
76
liberty clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
C. The Right of Privacy: The Right to Prevent
Procreation
The right of privacy issue was first noted in Griswold v.
Connecticut in 1965, where access to contraceptives was
considered part of the right of privacy inherent in the marital
relationship.
In 1972, the holding in Eisenstadt v. Baird
78
broadened this right of privacy to include single persons.
Eisenstadt declared that the right of privacy means that all persons
should be free from governmental intrusion in their decision
"whether to bear or beget a child.",79 The revolutionary Roe v.
Wade decision in 1973 further expanded the right to "encompass a
80
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."
Most recently, Planned Parenthood v. Casey reaffirmed the
previability abortion right established in Roe. 8 1 Griswold,
Eisenstadt, Roe, and Planned Parenthoodall established a right

71

76
77

See infra Parts III.C, III.D (explaining constitutional derivation of the right
of privacy).
Human Cloning andSubstantive Due Process, supranote 46, at 2353.
381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that statute prohibiting the use of
contraceptives was unconstitutional). Justice Douglas opined that a right of

privacy was inherent in the Bill of Rights, such as in the First Amendment's
freedom of association, the Fourteenth Amendment's protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment's selfincrimination protection, and in the Ninth Amendment's retention of
unenumerated rights by the people. Id.at 484; see Massie, supranote 18, at
78
79

148.
Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 453 (invalidating statute on equal protection grounds
that forbade the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons).
Id.

0 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
81

505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992).

120,
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not to procreate or not to bear a child by providing
constitutionally
82
protected access to contraception and abortion.

D. The Right of Privacy: The Right to Procreate
Also inclusive in the right of privacy cases are those
decisions that implicitly reflect a right to procreate, and to be free
from governmental intrusion in making decisions about
procreation. 83 As far back as 1942, the decision in Skinner v.
Oklahoma invalidated an Oklahoma statute that provided the
sterilization of some three-time felons and recognized in dictum
the fundamental right to procreate as "one of the basic civil rights
of man" and declared that "marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."84 The
Court, however, has never explicitly defined a positive right to
procreate.85
Judge Williams in Lifchez v. Hartiganimplied a positive right
to procreate based on Roe and Casey by stating that "[iut takes no
great leap of logic to see that within the cluster of constitutionally
protected choices that includes the right to have access to
contraceptives, there must be included within that cluster the right
to submit to a medical procedure that may bring about, rather than
prevent, pregnancy. ' 86 Arguing that the right to make procreative

82

83
14
85

86

Massie, supra note 18, at 148-49.
id.
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
Massie, supra note 18, at 150-51; see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974). Justice Stewart cited Eisenstadt to
imply support for an expanded reproductive right that includes not only a
right to prevent procreation but also the right to procreate in a decision
which held that a school district's extended maternity leave policies were
unconstitutional. Massie, supra note 18, at 151 (analyzing Cleveland Bd. of
Educ.).
735 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (I11. N. Dist. Ct. E. Div., 1990) (declaring the ban
on embryo experimentation unconstitutional for vagueness because the
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decisions includes the right of an infertile couple to have access to
assisted reproduction, including IVF and the use of a donated
embryo, she determined that the same constitutional right applies
to bringing about and preventing pregnancy. 87 The impact of this
non-binding decision remains unclear, but it is useful because it
illustrates the kind of reasoning that could be implemented in
future court decisions.
E. Limits to the Right of Privacy
The Court has defined limits to the constitutionally
protected right of privacy by excluding those liberties that are not
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition., 88
Fundamental rights such as the right of privacy are not absolute,
and regulations limiting these rights are justified when there is a
"compelling state interest." 89 Furthermore, any limitation
on a
fundamental right must be narrowly drawn to express a legitimate

87

88

statute did not define the terms "experimentation" and "therapeutic." It also
infringed upon a woman's fundamental right to privacy).
Andrews, supranote 23, at 665 (examining Lifchez).
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986)
(upholding state
prohibition against homosexual sodomy). The Court refused to include
homosexual behavior in the freedom of intimate association, claiming that
sodomy had long been considered a criminal offense and that such behavior
could not be considered a "fundamental libert[y] . . . 'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition."' Id.at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 719-20 (1997) (rejecting the right to physician assisted suicide,
declaring that it is not firmly rooted in historical and legal traditions). "That
many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound
in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any
and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected, and
Casey did not suggest otherwise." Id.at 727-28; but see David G. Savage,
Precedential Veto, A.B.A. J. 26, 28 (Mar. 2003) (noting that Bowers is
likely to be overruled when the Supreme Court re-examines sodomy laws in
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 953 (2002)). The Bowers decision is a
widely discredited precedent. Id.
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
406 (1963). In Roe, the compelling state interests were "interests in
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state interest. 90 Such constitutional limitations cast a compelling
shadow of doubt on whether the use of human cloning as a
reproductive option will be afforded constitutional protection, even
if the technology becomes feasible and safe and the Court decides
to broaden privacy protections to include the affirmative right to
bear a child. 9 1
IV. ANALYSIS
In general, commentators adhere to the principle and legal
trend that constitutional protection will be afforded to any new
reproductive technology. 92 They argue that a ban on human
cloning is unconstitutional because it infringes on the right to
procreate encompassed in the liberty clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 93 This is true to the extent that human
cloning is considered a method of reproduction and a method that
can be clustered with other constitutionally protected reproductive
technologies. 94 The argument that a ban on human cloning is
unconstitutional fails, however, if it is argued and proven that
cloning is not reproduction at all; 9 5 or to the extent that cloning is
reproduction, it is argued and proven that it is distinguished from

90

safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting
potential life." Roe, 410 U.S. at 165. These interests permitted states to
restrict abortions post-viability. Id.
at 183.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485; Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508
(1964); Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940); Eisenstadt, 405

U.S. at 463-64.
9' See infra Parts IV, V (discussing whether human cloning as a reproduction
option will be afforded constitutional protection).
92 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing Lifchez
and
granting all reproductive technologies the same protection under the same

constitutional right).
93 Andrews, supra note 23, at 665 (noting that under the Lifchez logic, the
right to create a child through cloning would be constitutionally protected).
94 See infra Parts IV.B-G (questioning human cloning as a method of
reproduction and distinguishing it from existing reproductive technologies).
See infra Part IV.B (arguing that human cloning is replication and not
reproduction).
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existing reproductive technologies because it falls outside the
96
realm of the constitutionally protected right to procreative liberty.
A. Introductionto the ConstitutionalAnalysis
Commentators tend to combine all potential reproductive
97
technologies under one constitutionally protected umbrella.
Judge Williams in Lifchez, for example, argues that within the
cluster of constitutionally protected choices of the right to have
access to contraceptives is also the right to submit to a medical
98
procedure that may bring about, rather than prevent, pregnancy.
Based on that line of reasoning, if cloning were successfully
attempted in humans, it would automatically offer an alternate
method of bringing about pregnancy and be protected as such
under the established constitutionally protected right to procreative
99
liberty.
John A. Robertson, in Children of Choice, also broadly
groups technologies that assist in reproduction, noting that
"[a]lthough] [a] full genetic reproduction might not exist in each
case, the interest of the couple in rearing children who are
biologically related to one or both rearing parents is so close to the
coital model that it should be treated equivalently."' 00 Robertson's
logic also suggests that if human cloning were successful, it would
constitute another method of noncoital reproduction that deserves
the same constitutional protection afforded to the coital model.' 0 '
96

97

See infra Part IV.E and accompanying text (distinguishing human cloning
from existing reproductive technologies).
See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (suggesting that methods
which bring about and prevent pregnancy should be protected by the same

constitutional right).

Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1377.
99 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (suggesting that methods to
conceive and prevent pregnancy should be protected by the same
constitutional right).
100 JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND
THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 39 (Princeton University
ed., 1994).
101 Massie, supra note 18, at 152-53.
98
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This logic does not hold true.' 0 2 The fact that the ultimate goal in.
all assisted reproductive scenarios is to achieve pregnancy does not
mean that all methods of noncoital reproduction should receive the
1 3
same degree of constitutional protection as coital reproduction. 0
Human cloning is not simply a reproductive technology that can or
should be clustered with the rest.
B. Human Cloning and Reproduction
Human cloning eludes the fundamental aspects of human
reproduction and therefore should not be granted constitutional
protection under any perceived interpretation of the right to
reproduce. 10 5 First, human cloning, unlike all other protected
methods of reproduction including sexual reproduction, artificial
insemination, IVF and GIFT, does not require "the union of an egg
and sperm from two human beings of the opposite sex."' 106 Rather,
cloning sidesteps the need for gametes, and permits the creation of
a new person with the genetic material from any single human
cell. 10 7 So-called reproduction without gametes is more similar to
asexual reproduction or replication than to any form of
reproduction that is currently constitutionally protected. 10 8 As
health law professor George Annas of Boston University argues,
cloning is synonymous with an evolutionary
dead end, replicating,
10 9
but not improving, what already exists.
In addition to sidestepping the need for a union between
sperm and egg, human cloning also eludes a historical fundamental
102

See infra Parts IV.C-E (distinguishing cloning as a noncoital method of

reproduction from all other existing methods).

Massie, supra note 18, at 152-53.
See infra Parts IV.B-G (arguing that human cloning falls outside the
constitutional realm of the right to procreative liberty).
105 See infra notes 102-10 and accompanying text (explaining how cloning
eludes the fundamental aspects of reproduction).
106 Annas, supra note 2, at 253.
107 Orentlicher, supra note 56, at 1019.
108 id.
103
104

109

Annas, supra note 2, at 256.
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aspect of reproduction by rendering the age of the genetic parent
irrelevant."l l Although the procedure requires a woman of
reproductive age to act as a gestational surrogate, human cloning
permits the production of a genetically related child from, for
example, a ninety-year-old woman or from a two-year old
toddler."' The genetic twin of a clone technically could be any
age and even be dead." l2 As a result, human cloning blurs
generational lines, which is a characteristic that distinguishes it
from all other constitutionally protected methods of
reproduction. 113
The fact that human cloning circumvents the need for the
union of sperm and egg and renders reproductive age irrelevant
suggests that the procedure cannot be categorized as reproduction
or protected as such. 114 Constitutional liberty rights do not
encompass a right to replicate or a right to be cloned." 15 Cloning
deviates so far from existing methods of reproduction that it leaves
the realm of protected reproductive choice.
C. Human Cloning and Incest
Human cloning is more comparable to incest than to
existing reproductive technologies. 117 Human cloning and incest
are methods of reproduction that produce offspring with such
18
similar genetic material that the lines of generation are blurred."
Generational lines mingle through incest when a child's father
i10 See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (explaining the lack of need

for a genetic parent of reproductive age in human cloning).
11 Talbot, supra note 2, at 40 (explaining how dead babies' mothers store
frozen tissue in case human cloning ever becomes possible). This dead baby
would be the genetic parent of the cloned infant. Id.

112

Andrews, supranote 23, at 652

113

Id.

See supraPart IV.B (distinguishing cloning procedure).
Annas, supra note 2, at 253-61.
116
Robertson, supranote 100, at 169.
17 See infra Part IV.C (analogizing cloning and incest).
18 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (explaining genetic
114

115

correlation between clones).
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could also be his uncle, and through human cloning, when a child's
mother could also be considered her identical twin.1 19 As a method
of reproduction, incest would seemingly implicate a constitutional
analysis under the right to reproduce. 12 0 As Lori Andrews notes,
"reproductive privacy and liberty are threatened as much by a
ban
on incest as by a ban on cloning."' 12 1 However, although incest is a
form of reproduction, it is banned without constitutional
challenge. 122 Perhaps it is banned because of the potential social
3
harms or physical risks to children conceived through incest.12
The same potential social and physical harms can be applied to
children produced through human cloning.1 24 Is there something
inherently wrong with human cloning that compels our instinct to
tell us that it, like incest, does not even warrant constitutional
125
analysis?
D. Human Cloning and Constitutional Protection
If human cloning represented the only way some
individuals could reproduce, then it would have to be
constitutionally protected so that these persons would not be
denied their right to procreative liberty. 126 The three primary target
categories used to justify the development of human cloning as a
method of reproduction, however, all have alternatives. 127 First,
,"9 Andrews, supra note 23, at 669.
120 See supra Parts II.C.D, III.D (discussing
constitutionally established right to
procreative liberty).
121
Andrews, supra note 23, at 669.
122

Id.

123

Id. at 255 (discussing potential risks to offspring resulting from incest such
as lethal recessive disorders). Andrews suggests that incest is banned not
because of the potential risks to offspring, but "[that] it allows an exercise
of excessive power of parents over children." Id.
Id.; see supraPart II.E (discussing risks inherent in human cloning).
Andrews, supra note 23, at 669.
Eibert, supra note 25 (promoting constitutional protection for human
cloning).
See supra Part II.D (discussing groups that might desire human cloning).

124
125
126

127
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completely infertile couples can use donor gametes to form an
embryo and subsequently gestate the resulting embryo in the
woman or in a surrogate. 128 Second, lesbian couples can
impregnate themselves with donor sperm. 2 9 Lastly, couples with
serious genetic mutations can take a chance, substitute either
gamete with a donor sperm or egg, or genetically test embryos in
vitro for the feared mutation. 130 Since rearing a child by existing
means is feasible in every scenario in which human cloning might
be desirable, human cloning is not medically necessary and does
not need to be constitutionally protected. 131 Even in the absence of
the availability of the use of cloning as a reproductive option,
every woman in America will still be able to "bear and beget" a
child if that is her choice.' 32 No one will be denied any rights for
33
the lack of human cloning. 1
E. Human CloningDistinguished
Although rearing a child by existing means is feasible in
every potential scenario, rearing a genetically related child may
only be possible for some couples if they use human cloning. 3 4
Therefore, despite the extensive alternatives, human cloning may
still be attractive to some couples as a means of producing a
genetically related child. 135 A chance to use human cloning,
however, merely serves to create a need for couples to have a
genetically related child, whereas existing reproductive
technologies assist the infertile who have a present need for
128
129

See supra Part II.B (explaining the existing methods of reproduction).
Green, supra note 47 (discussing reproductive options for lesbian couples);
see supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing artificial

130
131
132
133

134

insemination).

Green, supra note 47 (discussing present alternatives to human cloning).
Annas, supra note 2, at 261.
See supraPart II.B (explaining alternative assisted reproductive methods).

Annas, supranote 2, at 262.
See Eibert, supra note 25. If neither partner produces viable gametes,
for
example, they are unable to produce a genetically related child through

existing methods of assisted conception. Id.
Talbot, supra note 2, at 40.
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assistance in reproduction. 136 Furthermore, no Court decision thus
far has suggested that the constitutional right of privacy
encompasses a right to bear and beget a genetically related
child.137 In fact, no decision has even explicitly guaranteed a right
to procreate, which makes it a stretch to interpret the right of
privacy to also include the right to produce a genetically related
child, through human cloning or otherwise. 138 While these Court
decisions may protect the right to attempt to procreate, they
certainly do not guarantee a desired end. 3a9Moreover, the Court
will not protect a liberty interest, such as an interest in using
human cloning as a reproductive option that is not "deeply rooted
140
in this nation's history and tradition.'
F. Human Cloning and Infertility
As George Annas eloquently notes, "[t]reating infertility by
using the new reproductive technologies has become a
multimillion dollar business that is itself dominated not by the
medical ideology of the best interests of the patients and their
children, but by the market ideology of profit maximization under
the guise of reproductive liberty."' 14 1 The argument that human
cloning will offer a treatment for infertility, however, is baseless,
demonstrating that researchers cannot simply mask the
advancement of the technology behind the notion of reproductive

136

137

138

139
140
141

Andrews, supra note 1, at 256. Existing technologies permit couples to
"make up for a missing ingredient in the normal reproductive
process." Id.
Cloning a child creates a need that does not fit into the "existing category of
woman's reproductive choice." Id.; see also Annas, supra note 2, at 261.
Andrews, supra note 1, at 229 (noting "there is no 'right' to carry on one's
lineage"). Andrews explains that parents, for example, cannot force their
children to have children. Id.
See supra Part III.D (discussing cases pertaining to an implicit
right to
procreate).
See supraParts III.C-D (discussing cases pertaining to procreation).
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
Annas, supranote 2, at 272.
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liberty. 142 First of all, two out of three of the target categories of
individuals who researchers claim would benefit from human
cloning are technically fertile, including lesbian couples and
couples with serious genetic mutations. 143 Human cloning merely
creates another procreative option for these individuals to have a
genetically related child. 144 It also cannot be justified as a
medically necessary treatment for completely infertile couples
145
since they too have alternatives such as using donor gametes.
Although human cloning represents the only way that couples
could have a genetically related child, there is no constitutionally
protected right to bear a genetically related child. 146 As long as
their right to attempt to procreate using donor gametes is protected,
completely infertile couples cannot be denied their right to attempt
to reproduce. 14 7 Following this reasoning, the argument that
"cloning technology will offer the only way possible" for many
Americans to "exercise their right to reproduce" unjustifiably
expands this right to include the right to produce a genetically
related child, when no such right exists in our legal system.148 The
argument also casually overlooks the numerous means of bearing
and begetting a child, either half-related or unrelated, by assuming
that the cloning technology will
offer the only possible way for
49
some Americans to reproduce. 1
142

Id. (noting market domination over infertility and how progress is masked

143

under the guise of reproductive liberty).
See supra Part II.D (discussing categories of people interested in human
cloning).

144

Annas, supra note 2, at 250.

145

146

147

148

149

See supra Part IV.D (explaining how infertile couples can exercise their
right to reproduce through the use of donor gametes).
See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text (explaining that there is "no
right to carry on one's [own] lineage").
See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text (noting that no one will be
denied any rights if the use of human cloning as a reproductive option is not
practiced).
Eibert, supra note 25; Andrews, supra note 1, at 229 (noting that there is
not a "right to carry on one's [own] lineage").
See supra Part II.B (discussing existing methods of reproductive
technology); see also supra notes 127-30 (discussing alternatives for those
targeted to benefit from human cloning).

130

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vol. XXI

Some argue that cloning does not even address the medical
definition of infertility, which is based on reproductive age and an
inability to reproduce through sexual intercourse. 150 Since the
nature of human cloning defies the defining aspects of infertility
that includes the union of egg and sperm and the involvement of a
woman of reproductive age, it cannot be considered a treatment for
infertility. 151 As George Annas suggests, since cloning permits a
woman to replicate herself without male participation, it has
nothing "inherently to do with infertile couples" wishing to
52
reproduce. 1
G. Human Cloning,Infertility and the Market Factor
In light of all the hype, horror and fascination created by
Dolly, we must ask ourselves, who really wants to clone human
beings? 153 The bottom line is that infertile couples who enter the
world of assisted reproduction want a baby. 154 Although successful
human cloning would meet this end result of a baby, it could do so
in a most twisted, complicated manner by replicating the genomes
of existing people.' 55 For infertile couples, whether partially or
completely infertile, there are far more attractive options such as
IVF, artificial insemination, gamete donation, surrogacy, or
adoption. 156 Rather, it is the researchers who are driven by a
potentially untapped lucrative market that push for the social
acceptance of human cloning.1 57 They come up with plausible
150
151
152
153

154

See supra note 39 and accompanying text (defining infertility).
See supraPart IV.B (arguing that human cloning is not reproduction).
Annas, supra note 2, at 254.
See supra notes 2 & 68 and accompanying text (explaining public reaction
to Dolly).
Human Cloning and Substantive Due Process, supra note 46, at 2349
(declaring infertility a "social, biological and emotional tragedy").
Annas, supra note 2, at 256 (stating cloning "replicate[s] what already

156

exists").
Id. at 267; see also supra Part IL.B (discussing existing methods of assisted

157

reproduction).
Annas, supra note 2, at 258.
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reasons why human cloning is medically necessary and highlight
categories of persons who benefit from this technology. 58 As
George Annas argues, "[m]edicine has become a business, and
'' 59
business ethics have eclipsed medical ethics.
Since human cloning arguably does not even address the
medical definition of infertility and since infertile couples are not
demanding the advancement of the technology, researchers must
seek social justification for their cause elsewhere. 160 Researchers
derive their primary support from grieving parents who adhere to
16 1
the false perception that cloning will replace a deceased child.
The Radlians are one such group that have money and demands
from grieving families. 162 What the Radlians fail to accept is that
each human is unique and therefore irreplaceable, which makes a
quest to replace a human misguided. 163 As Margaret Talbot notes,
"[cloning] holds forth the promise of unprecedented control manufacturing a human being who will share specific traits with a
pre-approved model - but it cannot deliver."' ' 4 Despite the great
demand, a promise to replace someone merely serves to exploit
grief, has nothing do with infertility or reproduction, and will not
5
be constitutionally protected as such.16
V. CONCLUSION
Since the Court will only address existing constitutional
issues and refuses to anticipate future constitutional questions, the
158

Id. at 260. When IVF was first introduced in 1981, it was only used to assist
completely infertile couples, where now idiopathic infertility is "sufficient."

Id.
9 Id.

160

16'
162

163

at 258.

Id. at 258-59.
Talbot, supranote 2, at 43.
Id. Clonaid receives calls from parents of children who have died and have
frozen tissue from their children in the hope that someday, cloning the dead
will be possible. Id.
Id.

164

id.

165

Id.; see supra Part IV.F (arguing that human cloning does not apply to
infertility or reproduction).
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constitutionality of a ban on the use of human cloning as a
reproductive option remains open for debate.' 66 With Clonaid's
recent announcement of the birth of the world's first human clone,
however, Congress is likely to soon enact a ban.' 67 That ban will
undoubtedly be challenged as a violation of the constitutionally
68
protected right to procreative liberty.'
Lawyers will be challenged to present compelling
arguments in an attempt to implement leal brakes on the use of
human cloning as a reproductive option.'16 For a favorable ruling,
they will have to prove that human cloning is outside the realm of
any constitutionally protected right. 170 Lawyers could argue that
the use of human cloning as a reproductive option does not warrant
constitutional protection because alternatives exist in every
scenario, thereby satisfying everyone's right to procreative liberty
as established in the courts' decisions. 1 The fact that human
cloning would offer some couples the only way to rear a
genetically related child is a moot point because no explicit right to
procreate exists, nor does the broader right to rear a genetically
72
related child. 1

Alternatively, lawyers could argue that human cloning is
not reproduction at all and that it does not apply to infertility. 173
First, human cloning arguably is replication rather than

166
167

168
169

Massie, supra note 18, at 144.
Chemist Claims First Cloned Human, supra note 6 (reporting Clonaid's
claim and Congress' imminent action).
See supra Part III (discussing the constitutionality of reproductive
rights).
See supra Part IV (presenting arguments that human cloning falls
beyond
the realm of any perceived constitutional right to reproduce).

0 Id.
171

172

See supra Parts IV.D, IV.F (noting alternatives to human cloning exist for
any type of person seeking to rear a child).
See supra Part IV.E (noting the right to rear a genetically related child does

not exist).

173

See supra Parts IV.B (declaring that human cloning is replication rather
than
reproduction), IV.F (demonstrating why human cloning does not apply to
infertility).
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reproduction. 174 Secondly, it is a stretch to consider human cloning
reproduction and therefore an even greater stretch to consider it a
75
treatment for infertility. 1
To the extent that human cloning is reproduction, it is more
akin to incest than to existing reproductive technologies that are
constitutionally protected. 176 Human cloning and incest are
comparably repugnant forms of reproduction and neither warrant
constitutional protection. 177 Because human cloning eludes the
fundamental aspects of reproduction, including the need for the
union of sperm and egg and the need for a parent of reproductive
age, it thereby clearly falls far outside any liberty that is "deeply
1 78
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'
If the Court embraces the foregoing arguments, it will
uphold the constitutionality of the ban on human cloning, enabling
society to continue criminalizing those who attempt to implement
79
this risky and unnecessary procedure. 1

174 See supra Part

reproduction).

IV.B (declaring that human cloning is replication rather than

175

See supra Parts IV.B, IV.F (arguing that human cloning is not reproduction

176

See supraPart IV.C (comparing cloning to incest).

177

Id.

and that is does not apply to infertility).

Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92; see supra Part ]V.B (explaining how
human
cloning eludes the fundamental aspects of reproduction).
179 See supra Part II.E (highlighting the risks inherent
in human cloning).
178

